Soldiers of Destruction by Charles Sydnor

Author:Charles Sydnor [Sydnor, Charles]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War II
ISBN: 9780691214160
Google: PG7dDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2020-06-16T01:13:40+00:00

7. Himmler visits the Totenkopfdivision in Russia, December 1941.

In addition to the problems caused by inexperienced officers, Eicke complained, the division was weakened further by the inferior physical quality, laziness, and political ignorance of the newly arriving SS replacements. This was most notable, he claimed, among the ethnic German (Volksdeutsche) recruits. They seemed to Eicke weaker physically, more susceptible to illness and prone to cowardice than SS reservists who were true Reich Germans. Self-inflicted wounds, Eicke asserted, were common among the Volksdeutsche recruits, as were incidents of cowardice and sleeping on guard duty. In general, the new SS recruits were not physically tough enough to endure the primitive conditions and severe weather of the Russian war. To remedy the situation, Eicke suggested that Waffen SS training programs include exposure to severe weather for lengthy periods under combat conditions, and that the SS trainees be denied any food or shelter while they were left outside. Only a drastic revision of the Waffen SS training program, Eicke insisted, could prepare the SS man adequately to fight and survive in Russia.81

The worst thing about the new SS recruits, in Eicke’s estimation, was their “lack of political training and National Socialist indoctrination.” Men sent into the harsh crucible of Russia after only eight weeks of training, he lamented, were politically ignorant and did not arrive at the front as convinced Nazis. Therefore, Eicke claimed, many new SS men lacked the fanatical determination necessary for the struggle against bolshevism, and did not know the political realities of the Russian front. To correct this as quickly as possible, Eicke urged the SS Führungshauptamt to use more of the training period to indoctrinate the young SS men in the importance of the struggle.82

The tone of his pessimistic memorandum indicated Eicke doubted whether the weakened physical condition and low morale of his men would permit them to survive another prolonged period of heavy fighting. The dilemma of the Totenkopfdivision at the end of 1941 was largely self-imposed. Eicke’s division—like the other Waffen SS formations then fighting in Russia—was the victim of its own elite image. The typical Totenkopf qualities of reckless courage and fanatical determination had caused enormous casualties when met by skillful and equally fanatical Russian resistance. On the other hand, these Waffen SS traits had provided the extra punch needed for a local victory, or had (as at Lushno) been the margin of difference between a Russian breakthrough and the retention of a stable German front. Because of its dependability, especially in defensive fighting, the Totenkopfdivision by late November 1941 had become one of the key formations of Army Group North—a division whose presence in the area south of Lake Ilmen was crucial to the security of Leeb’s right wing. This fact was grudgingly recognized by many senior officers at the corps, army, and army group levels. Despite their private dislike for Eicke and his former desperadoes from the concentration camps, the army commanders in the northern sector clearly appreciated the special value of the Totenkopfdivision in a struggle like the Russian war.

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